CHIMAMANDA AND RELIGIOUS VALIDITY: A CATHOLIC X-RAY


Can religious validity be established by the spiritual satisfaction a belief system provides to its adherents? Don’t begin by flattering cultural sentiments, but with the nature of truth, the virtue of religion and the sovereignty of God.


PROLOGUE: WHEN TOLERANCE BECOMES AN ENEMY OF TRUTH

Have you noticed? There is a relativist posture masquerading as intellectual openness in contemporary discussions about African religion: whenever Christianity is criticised for its historical association with colonialism, African traditional religion is presented as something beyond theological criticism. Its deities must be respected, its religious practices must be validated, and its spiritual claims must be treated as equally legitimate expressions of human religious experience.

Often, the argument arrives dressed in the attractive language of cultural sensitivity, historical consciousness and religious tolerance; and is largely fascinating. 

Recently, I came across a reel which I later discovered is a clip from Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's address at the Humboldt Forum in Berlin, Germany, in September 2021, concerning the return of African artefacts taken during colonialism. 

To substantiate her thesis that some early Christian Missionaries sought to destroy African art and deities she affirms: 

“The point is that belief systems vary, and as long as they feed the spiritual needs of the people they are valid. We cannot be dismissive of a belief system merely because it is unfamiliar to us, just like we cannot be dismissive of history merely because we are uncomfortable with it.”

One may want to read that again to let it sink well.

There can be no doubts as to why that segment of the address was singled out to make a reel. Or could there? 

It encapsulates the central thesis of religious relativism which poses as normative to-day. It is a convenient soundbite for promoting religious pluralism, legitimising traditional African religious practices and portraying criticism of them as cultural intolerance. Above all, it appeals to the romanticisation of African traditional religions and feeds the emotional biases often associated with pan-Africanist ideology.

Indeed, at first reading, Chimamanda’s statement sounds reasonable. Does it not?

Who would advocate cultural arrogance? Who would defend the unnecessary destruction of indigenous artistic heritage? Who would encourage the dismissal of another people’s history?

But beneath this appealing language lies a much more consequential proposition: that religious validity can be established by the spiritual satisfaction a belief system provides to its adherents. Let that sink in. 

That is where the intellectual trouble begins for someone with her literary distinction, and educational achievements. 

Noteworthy is that,  the question is not whether people have spiritual needs. Certainly, they do. Neither is it whether African societies possessed religious traditions before the arrival of European missionaries. Certainly, they did.

The real question is whether every religious system that satisfies a community’s spiritual appetite is therefore true, legitimate and acceptable to God.

Think on this:

Must truth surrender its authority whenever it encounters cultural diversity? Must contradictory religious teachings be declared equally valid simply because different communities find some species of meaning and satisfaction in them?

A Catholic examination cannot begin by flattering cultural sentiments. It must begin with the nature of truth, the virtue of religion and the sovereignty of God.

Let us therefore examine the proposition.

I. THE FIRST ERROR: CONFUSING RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY WITH RELIGIOUS VALIDITY

The statement begins with an observation:

“Belief systems vary.”

Nobody needs to be educated about this elementary fact. Religious beliefs vary enormously across cultures, geographical locations and historical periods.

But what follows?

The author appears to assume that because religious systems differ, they should all be considered valid, provided they satisfy the spiritual needs of their adherents.

This is a logical non sequitur.

The existence of competing opinions does not establish the truth of those opinions. People disagree about medicine, astronomy, history, morality and the nature of reality. Their disagreement does not make every competing proposition true.

Consider a few examples:

  • Christianity teaches that Jesus Christ is God. Islam denies His divinity. Both propositions cannot be true in the same sense and under the same conditions.
  • Christianity teaches that Christ died and rose from the dead. A religious system denying His Resurrection cannot simultaneously be right about that same historical and theological claim.
  • Christianity teaches that there is one God. A religious system teaching the existence of several independent gods makes a contradictory claim.
  • Catholicism condemns idolatry as a violation of divine worship. A religious system that prescribes the worship of idols cannot be reconciled with Catholic teaching merely by describing both as different cultural expressions of spirituality.

Religious diversity establishes the existence of disagreement, not the equality of truth claims.

If contradictory propositions can all be declared valid simply because different communities believe them, then the very distinction between truth and falsehood has been abandoned.

Diversity is a sociological fact; validity is a question of truth. The former does not automatically establish the latter.

II. THE SECOND ERROR: MAKING SPIRITUAL SATISFACTION THE MEASURE OF TRUTH

She continues:

“And as long as they feed the spiritual needs of the people they are valid.”

This is perhaps the most revealing assumption in the entire proposition.

She substitutes psychological satisfaction and existential usefulness for objective truth.

But since when did satisfying a human need become proof that the belief satisfying it is true?

  • A person may derive comfort from an erroneous medical diagnosis, but the comfort does not make the diagnosis correct.
  • A person may find emotional satisfaction in believing that a deceased relative has become a deity, but that satisfaction does not establish the truth of the belief.
  • A person may find security in consulting an oracle, but the feeling of security does not establish the oracle’s supernatural authority.
  • A community may find meaning in a religious ceremony, but the communal significance of that ceremony does not establish that the object of its worship deserves divine honour.

A belief is not true because it comforts us. It is not false because it disturbs us. Its truth depends upon its conformity with reality.

Otherwise, we have replaced the search for truth with the management of human feelings.

This is religious pragmatism: judging religious claims primarily by their usefulness rather than their truth.

And it raises a rather embarrassing question for the Miss Chimamanda:

If a religious practice satisfies the spiritual needs of its adherents but violates the natural moral law, should it still be declared valid?

If the answer is yes, she has sacrificed objective morality at the altar of cultural satisfaction.

If the answer is no, then she has already admitted that spiritual satisfaction is not a sufficient criterion of religious validity.

III. THE THIRD ERROR: REDUCING RELIGION TO A CULTURAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT

The proposition assumes that the principal function of religion is to satisfy the spiritual requirements of a community.

But religion is not merely a cultural instrument for meeting human emotional needs.

Traditional Catholic theology understands the virtue of religion as that moral virtue by which man renders to God the worship and honour due to Him.

St Thomas Aquinas treats this subject extensively in the Summa Theologiae, II-II, Question 81.

Religion therefore concerns an objective relationship between man and God, not merely the subjective experience of a religious community.

Man does not invent God to satisfy his spiritual needs. Rather, man has a religious obligation because God exists and is his Creator.

The distinction is fundamental.

The question is not simply whether a religious system works for its adherents. The question is whether its teachings are true and whether its worship is directed to the One to whom worship is due.

The Vatican Council, in Dei Filius, Chapter II, teaches that God can be known with certainty by the natural light of human reason through created things. It also teaches that supernatural revelation was necessary because God ordained man to a supernatural end beyond the capacity of unaided human reason.

This is important in the African religious context.

Traditional African societies did not have to wait for European missionaries to discover that there is a Supreme Being. Human reason is capable of recognising the existence of a Creator through the created order.

But natural awareness of God is not identical with possession of the fullness of divine revelation.

IV. THE FOURTH ERROR: CONFUSING CULTURAL RESPECT WITH THE VALIDATION OF RELIGIOUS ERROR

Chimamanda affirms:

“We cannot be dismissive of a belief system merely because it is unfamiliar to us.”

This sounds reasonable, but it conceals an important equivocation.

There is a difference between dismissing something because it is unfamiliar and examining something because its claims are questionable.

Catholic theology does not teach that a proposition should be rejected merely because it originates from another culture.

Neither does it teach that a proposition should be accepted merely because it originates from an indigenous culture.

Truth is not determined by geographical origin.

An African belief is not true simply because it is African. Neither is a European belief true simply because it is European.

The same intellectual standards must apply to both.

Let us distinguish three things:

  1. African cultural heritage: language, music, sculpture, architecture, traditional dress, oral literature, artistic expression and historical institutions.
  2. African religious beliefs: doctrines concerning divinity, spirits, ancestors, creation, the afterlife and supernatural causation.
  3. African religious practices: sacrifices, invocations, divination, ritual offerings, ceremonies and acts of worship.

These categories may overlap, but they are not identical.

One can preserve an ancestral sculpture as an artistic and historical artefact without worshipping it.

One can study traditional music without endorsing every religious belief associated with its original performance.

One can appreciate the historical significance of an indigenous shrine without accepting the theological claims attached to it.

One can defend African cultural heritage without defending idolatry.

Indeed, the intellectual poverty of the argument becomes apparent when every criticism of an indigenous religious practice is treated as an attack on African identity.

Are Africans incapable of distinguishing their cultural heritage from their religious errors?

Must every traditional religious practice receive theological immunity simply because it is indigenous?

That would be an insult to the intellectual capacity of Africans.

V. THE FIFTH ERROR: SELECTIVE RELATIVISM AND THE DOUBLE STANDARD

There is a fundamental inconsistency in Chimamanda’s reasoning.

She appears to demand intellectual openness, tolerance and suspension of judgment when indigenous religious beliefs are concerned, yet she does not hesitate to subject Christian missionary activity to moral judgment and condemnation.

But on what grounds does she make that judgment?

Her argument is that belief systems are valid so long as they satisfy the spiritual needs of their adherents. If that is her criterion of religious validity, she cannot consistently condemn a religious practice simply because it offends her moral sensibilities. What if its adherents consider it spiritually necessary? What if a community derives spiritual satisfaction from a practice she herself considers objectionable? Must she then defend it as valid because it fulfils their spiritual needs?

If she refuses to do so, she has exposed the weakness of her own argument: she does not really believe that the satisfaction of spiritual needs makes every belief system valid. She has another standard by which she distinguishes acceptable from unacceptable beliefs and practices.

That is the very standard she needs to make explicit and apply consistently, rather than selectively suspending it when indigenous religions are concerned.

This is the error of selective relativism: demanding that Christianity be judged by moral and intellectual standards while shielding indigenous religious beliefs from equivalent scrutiny on the grounds of cultural identity.

There is a further confusion in her appeal to history. She insists, rightly, that history must not be dismissed merely because it is uncomfortable. But acknowledging historical facts is not the same as endorsing every belief, practice or institution found in history. Historical claims require evidence, documentation, testimony and critical investigation. Religious claims likewise require examination by reason and, in matters of supernatural revelation, by the credibility of the divine witness.

The existence of a practice is not proof of its moral legitimacy; its historical antiquity is not proof of its truth; and its cultural acceptance is not proof of its conformity to natural law or divine revelation.

The principles are straightforward:

  • An ancient error does not become truth through longevity.
  • A popular error does not become truth through widespread acceptance.
  • An indigenous error does not become truth through cultural identity.
  • A missionary action does not become wrong merely because it challenges an inherited religious practice.

Culture deserves historical study, not immunity from moral and religious judgment. Christianity must not be exempted from historical scrutiny, but neither should African traditional religions be exempted from rational and theological scrutiny.

VI. WHAT DOES THE CATHOLIC CHURCH ACTUALLY TEACH?

The Catholic position must be understood through three fundamental distinctions.

1. Natural religion and the knowledge of God

Man, by the natural light of reason, can know that God exists and that He is the Creator and Lord of all things.

St Paul makes this abundantly clear:

“For the invisible things of him, from the creation of the world, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made: his eternal power also, and divinity: so that they are inexcusable.” (Romans 1:20).

The Apostle then condemns those who, although knowing God, failed to glorify Him as God and exchanged His glory for images of corruptible creatures.

Notice something important here.

St Paul does not excuse idolatry on the grounds that it represents the religious heritage of a particular people.

Neither does he suggest that an erroneous religious practice becomes legitimate because it satisfies the spiritual needs of its practitioners.

Natural religious awareness is not the same thing as the possession of the fullness of religious truth.

2. Elements of truth outside Christianity

Traditional Catholic theology does not require us to deny that non-Christian peoples possess elements of religious truth.

The natural knowledge of God, moral principles, the recognition of man’s dependence upon a Supreme Being and the awareness of an afterlife are not exclusively Christian discoveries.

St Justin Martyr recognised that elements of truth could be found among non-Christian philosophers. He discussed the participation of men in the Logos in his First Apology, Chapter 46.

But recognising elements of truth is not the same as validating an entire religious system.

A religious tradition may preserve certain truths while simultaneously containing serious errors.

The presence of truth in a system does not make all its teachings true.

We must therefore distinguish between what is true in a religious tradition and what is erroneous in it.

Catholic theology has no difficulty making that distinction.

3. The uniqueness of Jesus Christ and the Catholic religion

Our Lord Jesus Christ declared:

“I am the way, and the truth, and the life. No man cometh to the Father, but by me.” (John 14:6).

He did not present Himself as one cultural expression of a universal religious experience.

He said He is the Way, the Truth and the Life.

The Apostles proclaimed the same truth:

“Neither is there salvation in any other. For there is no other name under heaven given to men, whereby we must be saved.” (Acts 4:12).

The pre-Vatican II Church was unequivocal about the unity of Christian faith.

  • Pope Leo XIII, in Satis Cognitum (1896), explained that Christ instituted one Church, one in its doctrine, origin and constitution.
  • Pope Pius XI, in Mortalium Animos (1928), rejected religious indifferentism and the treatment of contradictory doctrinal positions as though they could be reconciled by a common religious arrangement.
  • Pius XI specifically warned against the notion that dogmatic truth is relative and accommodates itself to the changing needs and tendencies of human society.

The Catholic position is therefore not that every religion is equally valid because every people has spiritual needs.

It is that every human being has a religious obligation, and that the fullness of divinely revealed religion is found in Jesus Christ and His Church.

VII. THE MISSIONARY QUESTION: CONDEMN THE ABUSE, NOT THE GOSPEL

Now let us address the historical accusation that Christian missionaries sought to destroy African art and deities.

It is historically possible to document instances in which missionaries participated in the destruction, suppression or disparagement of indigenous cultural objects and practices.

Such incidents must be investigated honestly. Where injustice occurred, it should be acknowledged and condemned.

But historical honesty requires distinctions.

We must distinguish:

  • The destruction of an artistic object because of cultural arrogance.
  • The rejection of an object because it was employed in idolatrous worship.
  • The suppression of a cultural practice because it was associated with a religious error.
  • The unjust treatment of people who adhered to traditional religious practices.

These are not necessarily the same thing.

An artistic object may possess cultural and historical value even when the religious use to which it was put is objectionable.

A missionary could therefore be wrong to destroy an artistic object unnecessarily while being perfectly right to oppose the idolatrous worship associated with it.

The Catholic faith does not command cultural vandalism. Neither does it require the Church to approve religious error in the name of cultural preservation.

We must also distinguish the historical conduct of individual missionaries from the truth of the religion they professed.

A missionary’s unjustifiable destruction of a work of art does not establish that Christianity is false.

Equally, the existence of African religious artefacts does not establish the truth of the religious beliefs associated with them.

One can condemn the unnecessary destruction of indigenous artistic heritage without approving idolatry.

One can defend African cultural history without defending every religious practice that existed in African societies.

And one can acknowledge the sins of individual missionaries without making the Gospel responsible for every abuse committed in its name.

The historical misconduct of a Christian does not invalidate the doctrine of Christ, just as the misconduct of an African traditional religious practitioner does not invalidate African history.

The same standard must apply to both.


VIII. THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: CAN CONTRADICTIONS BE MADE COMPATIBLE BY CELEBRATING DIVERSITY?

Let us bring the argument to its logical conclusion.

  • Suppose one religious system teaches that Jesus Christ is God, while another teaches that He is not God.
  • Suppose one teaches that the Resurrection of Jesus Christ is a historical reality, while another denies it.
  • Suppose one teaches that there is one God, while another teaches that there are several independent gods.
  • Suppose one teaches that God is a Trinity of Persons in one divine Nature, while another rejects the Trinity.
  • Suppose one teaches that Jesus Christ is true God and true Man, possessing two natures in one Divine Person, while another regards Him as merely human, a prophet or a created being.
  • Suppose one teaches that Christ died on the Cross as a propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of mankind, while another denies the redemptive significance of His death.
  • Suppose one teaches that Christ rose bodily and gloriously from the dead, while another interprets the Resurrection as merely symbolic.
  • Suppose one teaches that Christ will return visibly to judge the living and the dead, while another denies His personal Second Coming.
  • Suppose one teaches that there is a Heaven and a Hell, with eternal reward and eternal punishment, while another denies eternal punishment or the existence of Hell.
  • Suppose one teaches that man possesses an immortal rational soul, while another denies the soul’s survival after bodily death.
  • Suppose one teaches that there is an objective moral law established by God, while another maintains that morality is principally a human or cultural construction.
  • Suppose one teaches that marriage is a lifelong, indissoluble union between one man and one woman, while another recognises polygamous arrangements or same-sex unions as equally valid forms of marriage.
  • Suppose one teaches that sexual relations belong exclusively within marriage, while another permits sexual relations outside marriage.
  • Suppose one teaches that contraception is intrinsically immoral, while another approves its deliberate use.
  • Suppose one teaches that abortion is the deliberate killing of an innocent human being, while another regards it as a legitimate exercise of reproductive choice.
  • Suppose one teaches that human life is sacred from conception until natural death, while another permits its deliberate termination under certain circumstances.
  • Suppose one teaches that suicide is contrary to the natural moral law, while another regards assisted suicide as an acceptable expression of personal autonomy.
  • Suppose one teaches that Christ established one visible Church, while another teaches that the Church is merely an invisible collection of independently constituted religious communities.
  • Suppose one teaches that the Church possesses divinely instituted authority to teach, govern and sanctify, while another maintains that every individual is his own final religious authority.
  • Suppose one teaches that Baptism is a sacrament instituted by Christ and necessary for salvation, while another regards it as merely an optional public declaration of faith.
  • Suppose one teaches that the Holy Eucharist is truly the Body and Blood of Christ, while another regards it as merely bread and wine symbolising Christ.
  • Suppose one teaches that the Mass is the true sacramental re-presentation of Christ’s Sacrifice on Calvary, while another regards the Lord’s Supper as simply a commemorative meal.
  • Suppose one teaches that sins committed after Baptism can be forgiven through sacramental Confession, while another rejects sacramental confession altogether.
  • Suppose one teaches that the saints in Heaven can intercede for the faithful on earth, while another rejects the invocation of saints as unlawful.
  • Suppose one teaches that the Blessed Virgin Mary is truly the Mother of God because her Son is God incarnate, while another rejects this title.
  • Suppose one teaches that the faithful departed can benefit from prayers and suffrages, while another denies the existence of Purgatory.
  • Suppose one teaches that miracles are possible manifestations of divine intervention, while another maintains that miraculous events are impossible.
  • Suppose one teaches that Divine Revelation is transmitted through Sacred Scripture and Sacred Tradition, while another accepts Scripture alone as the sole infallible rule of faith.
  • Suppose one teaches that religious truth is objectively knowable and binding, while another maintains that contradictory religious claims can all be equally true.
  • Suppose one condemns the worship of images as idolatry, while another prescribes the worship of images.
  • Suppose one teaches that idolatry is a grave violation of the First Commandment, while another prescribes the worship of false gods.
  • Suppose one teaches that Christ is the universal Saviour of mankind and that salvation comes through Him, while another maintains that different religions are independently valid paths to God.
  • Suppose one teaches that faith must be accompanied by charity and good works, while another presents faith as sufficient irrespective of the necessity of sanctification.

Are these merely different cultural expressions of the same truth?

Certainly not.

They are contradictory propositions.

And the principle of non-contradiction remains applicable regardless of the geographical location, cultural identity or religious sentiments of those making the claims.

A proposition cannot be true and false simultaneously, in the same sense and under the same conditions.

The author cannot escape this elementary principle by invoking religious diversity.

If every contradictory religious claim is valid, then none has any meaningful claim to objective truth.

Christianity becomes merely one cultural preference among others, and Christ becomes one religious figure among competing spiritual personalities.

But that is not Christianity.

The Catholic does not profess Christ because Christianity happens to satisfy his cultural or psychological needs. He professes Christ because he believes that God has revealed Himself through Him and that the claims of Christ are true.

The question, therefore, is not whether different religions exist. It is whether their respective claims withstand examination.

DIVERSITY IS NOT A DISPENSATION FROM LOGIC

There is nothing inherently wrong with acknowledging the existence of different cultures, languages, customs and religious convictions. Neither is every difference necessarily a contradiction. Different peoples may express the same truth through different languages, ceremonies and legitimate cultural forms.

But diversity cannot transform falsehood into truth, nor can cultural sensitivity repeal the law of non-contradiction.

Two people may describe the same reality differently without contradicting each other. But when one affirms what another denies, the disagreement cannot be dissolved by simply celebrating their differences.

One cannot affirm that Christ is God and, in the same sense, affirm that He is not God. One cannot affirm the bodily Resurrection and simultaneously deny that it occurred. One cannot affirm that there is exactly one God and simultaneously affirm several independent gods.

Calling such contradictions diversity does not resolve them. It merely gives the disagreement a more attractive name.

THE CATHOLIC POSITION: TRUTH IS NOT A CULTURAL NEGOTIATION

The Catholic Church does not teach that all religions are equally true or that contradictory religious doctrines become compatible through mutual recognition.

Religious error may be tolerated under certain circumstances; its adherents may be treated with justice, charity and respect. But tolerance of persons is not approval of their errors, and respect for religious freedom is not an obligation to declare every religious proposition true.

The First Commandment remains binding upon all mankind. Christ remains the one Mediator between God and men. Divine Revelation is not subject to a democratic vote among competing religious systems.

The ultimate question is not how many religions exist, how ancient their traditions are, how sincerely their adherents believe, or how culturally significant their practices may be.

The ultimate question is: What has God actually revealed?

And if God has revealed the truth, no amount of religious pluralism can make its contradiction equally true.

Truth does not need diversity to become true, and error does not become truth because diversity has been celebrated.


IX. AN INSTRUCTION IN INTELLECTUAL HONESTY

There is a particular kind of ignorance that presents itself as enlightenment.

It borrows the vocabulary of tolerance, cultural sensitivity and historical consciousness while refusing to subject its own assumptions to critical examination.

Chimamanda needs to understand that respecting people is not the same as validating their beliefs; appreciating a culture is not the same as endorsing its religious errors; and acknowledging the historical abuses of missionaries is not the same as disproving Christianity.

African cultural heritage deserves serious historical investigation and preservation.

African religious beliefs deserve honest examination.

But neither African identity nor historical victimhood confers immunity from rational and theological criticism.

If she wishes to argue that Christian missionaries unjustly destroyed African artistic heritage, let her produce the historical evidence and establish the particular injustices.

But she should not smuggle religious relativism into that historical argument.

The fact that a belief system satisfies the spiritual appetite of a people does not establish that the object of their worship exists, that their religious doctrines are true, or that their worship is morally legitimate.

A man may sincerely believe a falsehood. A whole community may inherit it. Several generations may find comfort in it. None of these circumstances transforms falsehood into truth.

And this is where she needs a lesson in elementary logic:

Truth is not determined by the number of people who believe it, the culture from which it originates, the antiquity of its practice, or the emotional satisfaction it provides.

If two religious systems make contradictory claims, one cannot escape the contradiction by celebrating their diversity.

The task of an intelligent person is not to declare every competing claim valid. It is to investigate which claims are true.

EPILOGUE: AFRICAN CULTURE DESERVES RESPECT; TRUTH DESERVES OBEDIENCE

Let nobody misunderstand the Catholic position.

  • We do not have to despise Africa to evangelise Africa.
  • We do not have to destroy African art to preach Christ.
  • We do not have to deny the existence of pre-Christian African religious traditions to affirm the uniqueness of Christianity.
  • And we certainly do not have to pretend that every African religious belief is true in order to demonstrate that we appreciate African identity.

The Gospel does not become less true because it was preached by European missionaries. Neither does an indigenous religious belief become true because it was practised by African ancestors.

Our ancestors deserve historical investigation, not intellectual immunity.

Their artistic achievements deserve preservation, not indiscriminate destruction.

Their religious beliefs deserve honest examination, not automatic validation.

And their descendants deserve something better than the intellectual laziness of being told that whatever satisfies their spiritual needs must necessarily be valid.

There is a difference between acknowledging the existence of differing religious beliefs and abandoning the obligation to distinguish religious truth from error.

Tolerance may demand that we refrain from persecuting people for their beliefs. It does not demand that we abandon reason, suspend judgment or pretend that contradictory propositions are equally true.

The Catholic cannot negotiate the identity of Christ to accommodate cultural relativism.

Our Lord did not say that He was one of several equally valid ways to the Father. He said:

“I am the way, and the truth, and the life.”

That declaration is either true or false. It cannot be reduced to a cultural preference.

And if it is true, then every people, every culture and every generation has something more important to discover than the spiritual satisfaction of its inherited beliefs: it has the truth of Jesus Christ to embrace.

Yes. Africa does not need every inherited belief sanctified by cultural sentiment. It needs the wisdom to discern what accords with natural law, preserve whatever is good and true, reject error and embrace the fullness of religious truth revealed in Jesus Christ.

Be not mistaken about this: the ultimate obligation of man is not to defend the religious preferences of his ancestors, but to worship the true God in truth.


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